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GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: HOW
THE COURTS DISMANTLED THE DOCTRINE
OF SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE
TREVOR FINDLEY†
INTRODUCTION
Most Americans with a basic understanding of civics can tell you
that the legislative branch creates the law, the executive branch
implements the law, and the judicial branch interprets the law. Any
lawyer can tell you that the lines between creating, implementing, and
interpreting the law are not clear cut. Absent meaningful guidance
from Congress, blurred lines and inconsistent interpretations are
particularly apparent in the regulation of biotechnology in the United
States. Because the laws governing biotechnology are based on laws
that predate the advent of genetically engineered (“GE”) crops,1 they
are often inadequate to address the unique concerns presented by
genetic engineering, such as compositional differences in food
products, cross-pollination with non-genetically engineered crops, and
what authority agencies have to regulate and monitor the use of GE
products. As a result, Congress needs to provide meaningful authority
for the regulation of biotechnology.
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Doctor of Jurisprudence, Willamette University College of Law. Masters in Education,
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1. Throughout this article, “genetically engineered,” “genetic engineering” and
“biotechnology” refer to modern biotechnology, which are “new and controversial techniques
which involve the transfer of genes between species in a manner and at a speed not previously
possible.” Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating
Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 398 n.21 (2007). More
specifically, Article 3 of the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity defines
modern biotechnology as: “[T]he application of: (a) [i]n vitro nucleic acid techniques, including
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or
organelles, or (b) fusion of cells beyond taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological
reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding
and selection.” Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3
Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027. The author recognizes that others may define biotechnology in
much broader terms that include traditional plant breeding techniques, such as hybridization and
cross-pollination, which have taken place for centuries.
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From the outset, the regulation of biotechnology has largely
occurred outside the halls of Congress. Currently, the executive
branch of the United States relies on the Coordinated Framework for
the Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework”), which
is a legacy of the Reagan Administration. In drafting the Coordinated
Framework, the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the
Executive Office of the President interpreted existing laws to
determine what authority government agencies had to regulate
biotechnology. Lacking meaningful guidance from Congress, the
executive and judicial branches have been at the front of setting
governmental policy for regulating biotechnology today.
If the U.S. laws applicable to GE crops actually fit into the existing
framework, as the drafters of the Coordinated Framework suggested,
regulation outside the halls of Congress would not necessarily be a
problem. But, as this article demonstrates, the use of GE technology
in the United States has not fallen squarely within existing legal
authority, courts have struggled to interpret Coordinated Framework
principles, and gaps have emerged which do not adequately protect the
interests of all Americans.
One example illustrates the Coordinated Framework’s
inadequacy. After ten years of research, scientists in Australia’s
national research organization, the Commonwealth Science and
Industrial Research Organization, ended a project to bring GE peas to
market.2 The peas contained a natural protein gene from green beans
that prevents weevils from digesting starch, thereby causing them to
starve to death.3 The protein from the donor plant, the green bean,
had no history of allergenicity.4 Just before the scientists were ready
to release the GE pea onto the market, they completed an additional
study that revealed the protein from the green bean plant, when
expressed in the pea plant, demonstrated allergenic properties in mice.5
Not only was the GE pea allergenic, it caused the mice to react to other
allergens.6 A heretofore non-allergenic protein became allergenic
when transferred to a new plant. Had researchers not completed the
additional study, which they were under no regulatory obligation to

2. Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk Assessment
and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to Indeterminacy Trigger the Need
for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 232 (2009).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 233.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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complete, the potentially allergenic pea plant would have been
commercially available on the market.
Although this specific example originates in Australia, a U.S.
manufacturer of a similar GE pea plant would have been under no
obligation to complete allergenic testing and could have released the
product to the market.7 Alternatively, if Australia had not completed
the additional study and instead commercialized the crop, growers and
retailers in the United States could have easily imported the product
and sold it to American consumers without them knowing of its
allergenic properties.8 As this example makes clear, the Coordinated
Framework fails to mandate safety testing accounting for potential
allergenicity, among other things, in GE products.
This article first analyzes the Coordinated Framework and its
origins. After examining the current regulatory structure, the article
examines two different cases in each of three different areas impacted
by GE products: food safety and composition, the environment, and
intellectual property. A look at each of these cases highlights the
judiciary’s approach to the Coordinated Framework and the
framework’s underlying principle of substantial equivalence, and
illuminates some of the challenges in applying existing law to new
technology. Finally, the article analyzes the ways in which courts
appear reluctant to perpetuate the doctrine of substantial equivalence
but lack the authority necessary to provide meaningful results.
Consequently, the article concludes that Congress should abandon the
untenable Coordinated Framework and provide meaningful authority
for the regulation of biotechnology.
I.

THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK

In 1986, the United States government determined that the
existing regulatory framework was sufficient to regulate
biotechnology, premising this idea on the notion that products of

7. See Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified
Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 446–47 (2002) (discussing the regulatory process in the
United States under an identical scenario and concluding that a manufacturer could determine
that, “a plant with a previous history of safe use containing increased levels of a previously
produced protein not ‘known’ to be toxic is substantially equivalent to the unmodified plant and
is therefore [generally recognized as safe]”). Id. at 446.
8. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 413 (citing USDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY and 21ST CENTURY AGRICULTURE, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE DECADE AHEAD (2006), http://www.usda.gov/docume
nts/final_main_report-v6.pdf (acknowledging regulatory gaps, including the import of GE
products from other countries).
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biotechnology are substantially equivalent to their natural
counterparts. As a result, the government determined it did not need
new laws or regulations to regulate biotechnology or to determine the
safety of products derived from biotechnology. The United States
presented this idea in the 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology.9 The Coordinated Framework recognized the use of
genetic engineering as an extension of traditional plant breeding
techniques such as hybridization and selective breeding.10 The working
group responsible for its drafting “sought to achieve a balance between
regulation adequate to ensure health and environmental safety while
maintaining sufficient regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the
growth of an infant industry.”11 With the backdrop of increased
technological innovation in Asia and under the leadership of a
president known for deregulation, the government recognized that the
biotechnology industry needed flexibility in order to remain
competitive and that science could likely advance faster than the
government could regulate.12 As a result, U.S. policy toward
biotechnology has been favorable to industry from the outset.13
Central to the Coordinated Framework is the notion that the final
product, and not the process by which it was created, should be the
focus of regulation.14 According to the drafters, existing laws regulated
the safety of food and pesticide products created using traditional plant
breeding techniques; because genetic engineering is an extension of
traditional techniques, “[t]his approach provides the opportunity for
similar products to be treated similarly by regulatory agencies.”15 By
focusing on the product, regardless of the process by which it is created,
regulatory authority covers genetically engineered products just as
they would conventionally grown products.16 This authority includes
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and the Plant

9. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302,
23,303 (June 26, 1986).
10. Id. at 23,302.
11. Id. at 23,302–03.
12. Id. at 23,303.
13. Luis Acosta, Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (July 9, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php (“Compared
to other countries, regulation of GMOs in the US is relatively favorable to their development.”).
14. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 406.
15. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at
23,302.
16. McGarity, supra note 7, at 427.
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Protection Act (PPA). The following briefly highlights the
responsibilities of the three main agencies involved in the regulation of
agricultural biotechnology.
A. The Food and Drug Administration
Consistent with the Coordinated Framework, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) did not implement any regulations to govern
biotechnology, but instead relied on existing laws and a non-binding
policy statement. Under the FDCA, the FDA has the authority to
regulate adulterated food, food labeling, and food additives, among
other things.17 Adulterated food is food that “bears or contains any
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to
health.”18 If the FDA ever determined that a GE food may be injurious
to health, it would have the authority to regulate that food.
A food additive is “any substance the intended use of which results
or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any
food.”19 If a substance is “generally recognized as safe” (“GRAS”) by
experts in the field, it is not a food additive and may be added to food
without approval by the FDA.20 Based on the doctrine of substantial
equivalence, the FDA concluded in its 1992 Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties (“Statement of Policy”), that in
“most cases, the substances expected to become components of food
as a result of genetic modification of a plant will be the same as or
substantially similar to substances commonly found in food.”21 As a
result, the FDA presumes that most GE foods are GRAS.22 The FDA
also enforces EPA tolerance levels for pesticide residue on foods, but
does not engage in any form of ongoing monitoring of GE foods.23
B. Environmental Protection Agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority
under FIFRA to regulate a substance that prevents, destroys, repels,

17. Id.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2012).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012).
20. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 408.
21. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
22,985 (May 29, 1992).
22. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 408.
23. Id. at 410.
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or mitigates a pest.24 This includes the authority to regulate transgenic
mutations such as bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a bacteria endogenously
produced in some GE crops to prevent pests.25 The EPA also has
authority under FDCA to set tolerance levels for pesticide residue on
foods and can exempt entire classes of pesticides from having a
tolerance level.26 The EPA does not have authority to regulate GE
plants that do not produce pesticides.27 Although the EPA can regulate
the amount of pesticide use on herbicide resistant GE crops, such as
glyphosate resistant corn and soybeans, it does not have regulatory
authority over the crops themselves.28
C. United States Department of Agriculture
Under the Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957 later combined with
other authority to create the Plant Pest Act of 2000 (PPA), the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has authority to regulate
products of biotechnology that rely on bacteria or viral vectors.29 This
authority extends only to GE crops that use known plant pests and
does not require the USDA to examine GE crops that do not use
known plant pests.30
Like other government agencies, APHIS begins its analysis of GE
crops under the assumption that GE crops are substantially equivalent
to their natural counterparts.31 In general, APHIS does not require a
permit before a biotech company begins field trials of a GE crop.32
Rather, APHIS utilizes a less stringent notification procedure.33 After
field testing, the biotech company can petition for deregulation and

24. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012).
25. EPA’s Regulation of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Crops, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/regofbtcrops.htm (last updated May
2015).
26. Linda Beebe, In re Starlink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an
Inadequate Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
511, 519 (2004).
27. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 411.
28. Id.
29. Alison Peck, The Case of GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 660 (2013).
30. Beebe, supra note 26, at 518.
31. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 412.
32. Id.
33. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3 (2016).
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subsequently, commercial sale of the product.34 Once deregulated,
APHIS no longer has authority over a GE crop.35
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE
The underlying assumption of the Coordinated Framework, made
with little explanation, is that GE seeds create a product substantially
equivalent to seeds created by traditional breeding techniques.36 To
the extent the Coordinated Framework substantiates this underlying
assumption of substantial equivalence, it highlights that genetic
engineering “enable[s] more precise genetic modifications, and
therefore hold[s] the promise for exciting innovation and new areas of
commercial opportunity.”37 Because it is more precise, it seems, there
should be little concern about anything other than its ability to drive
new markets.
While the Coordinated Framework demonstrates the
government’s reliance on the doctrine of substantial equivalence, the
100+ page document only uses the phrase “substantially equivalent”
three times, all in reference to medical devices.38 The phrase
“substantial equivalence” first came into popular parlance in a
document published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development—the Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by
Modern Biotechnology, Concepts and Principles (“OECD Safety
Evaluation”)—in 1992.39 The report focuses exclusively on the safety
of food for human health, and does not consider the safety of
genetically engineered crops on animals or the environment.40
When the OECD used substantial equivalence, it examined the
process for evaluating the safety of new foods, and not the presumption
that foods created by biotechnology are substantially equivalent to
their natural counterparts.41 The safety evaluation, however, largely
appears as an attempt to demonstrate that biotech products are

34. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 412.
35. Id.
36. McGarity, supra note 7, at 431.
37. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at
23,302.
38. See generally id.
39. McGarity, supra note 7, at 428.
40. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES (1993) [hereinafter “OECD Safety Evaluation”].
41. See generally id.
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substantially equivalent to their natural counterparts, thereby
obviating the need for further analysis.42
In order to show substantial equivalence, a regulator should look
at any processing the food may undergo, the use of the food in the
human diet, the exposure of the food to humans, the pattern of
consumption, and the attributes of consumers.43 The OECD also
recommends looking at the traits, composition, and characteristics of
the traditional or parental organism; potential secondary effects of the
modification; and any knowledge of the new product and its new
traits.44 When a regulator determines a product is not substantially
equivalent to its natural counterpart or it has no natural counterpart,
additional testing is necessary.45
Although the OECD report appears to suggest regulators have to
prove substantial equivalence by examining the genetically engineered
product and considering a number of factors, the process it outlines
seems woefully inadequate given that scientists are creating new food
through processes not exhibited in nature.46 Instead, according to the
OECD, “the most practical approach to the determination of [the]
safety [of GE foods] is to consider whether they are substantially
equivalent to analogous conventional products.”47 Thus, the first step
in determining safety is to determine whether the GE product is
substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart. Once completed,
safety appears to be a foregone conclusion.48
The case studies included in the OECD Safety Evaluation provide
more guidance than the main text of the document.49 Case study one,
completed by the FDA, explains the process for determining the safety
of genetically engineered microbial chymosin, as compared to that of
its natural counterpart, animal rennet.50 In the case study, the FDA
determined that, although functionally identical, the processes used by
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14–15.
46. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 430 (“Employing the substantial equivalence doctrine [will
not] take into account all of the subtle changes in delicately balanced biochemical pathways within
genetically engineered plants.”).
47. OECD Safety Evaluation, supra note 40, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
48. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 430–31 (“[T]he substantial equivalence doctrine is not so
much a ‘scientific’ risk assessment tool as it is an excuse for regulatory agencies to avoid their
responsibilities.”).
49. See id. at 430–31 (noting the great amount of discretion and flexibility in determining
substantial equivalence).
50. OECD Safety Evaluation, supra note 40, at 21–22.
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manufacturers to create chymosin and rennet are different enough to
warrant a formal review “in order to determine whether the new
preparation was substantially equivalent to the traditional one.”51
Thus, the FDA did not start from the position of substantial
equivalence even though the two enzymes are functionally identical.
Instead, it examined the production process, which used procedures
substantially equivalent to those it would use for other, non-genetically
engineered enzymes, to determine that chymosin’s use as an enzyme in
food is safe.52 Thus, unlike the Coordinated Framework, the FDA
appears to have examined the process to determine safety for purposes
of the OECD Safety Evaluation.
Therefore, the doctrine of substantial equivalence in the United
States appears to be of mixed origin. The underlying principles are
rooted in the Coordinated Framework, which acknowledged that the
laws governing naturally occurring counterparts were sufficient to
regulate products of biotechnology. The actual phrase “substantial
equivalence” as it relates to food originates in the OECD Safety
Evaluation, although apparently in a slightly different context than the
proposition for which it stands today in the United States. For
purposes of this article, the relevant point is that the approach of the
executive and legislative branches of government remains relatively
unchanged since the 1986 Coordinated Framework.53 For producers of
agricultural biotech products in the United States, this means they
continue to operate in a framework where the underlying
presumption—one which they need not independently prove in the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Just prior to publication, the Obama Administration released its proposed updates to
the Coordinated Framework. On January 4, 2017, days before the end of President Obama’s
Administration, the White House released the “2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for
the Regulation of Biotechnology” and the “National Strategy for Modernizing the Regulatory
System for Biotechnology Products.” Along with the announcement, the FDA and the USDA
released proposed rules to update how they regulate biotechnology. Because of uncertainty
surrounding the Trump Administration’s approach to new regulations-and the likelihood such
proposed regulations will be implemented in their current form-it would be premature to include
an analysis of the proposed regulations in this article. See Robbie Barbero, James Kim, Ted
Boling, & Julia Doherty, Increasing the Transparency, Coordination, and Predictability of the
Biotechnology Regulatory System, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archiv
es.gov/blog/2017/01/04/increasing-transparency-coordination-and-predictability-biotechnology-r
egulatory; Regulation of Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA in Animals; Draft Guidance for
Industry; Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 6,561 (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/docume
nts/2017/01/19/2017-00839/regulation-of-intentionally-altered-genomic-dna-in-animals-draft-gui
dance-for-industry-availability; U.S. Dept. of Agric, 2017 Proposed Biotechnology Regulations
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/biotech-rule-revision/
2016-340-rule/2016-340-home.
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regulatory process—is that products of biotechnology are substantially
equivalent to their natural counterparts.54
III. BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS
This section examines the judicial branch’s approach to
biotechnology by examining two cases in three different areas
impacted by biotechnology: food safety and composition, the
environment, and intellectual property.
A. Food Safety and Composition
One of the first challenges to the Coordinated Framework took
place in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala.55 The plaintiffs included
scientists, religious leaders, and other individuals concerned about GE
foods.56 They challenged the FDA’s Statement of Policy in which it
announced that foods created through biotechnology were generally
recognized as safe under the FDCA, and therefore not subject to
regulation as food additives.57 The FDA made the Statement of Policy
without notice and comment, and did not provide an environmental
assessment or an environmental impact statement.58
The Statement of Policy reaffirmed the FDA’s commitments
made under the Coordinated Framework that the product, and not the
process, should be the focal point for determining safety.59 The FDA
also acknowledged that its position was consistent with the “concepts
of substantial equivalence of new foods discussed in a document under
development” by the OECD,60 confirmed that products made with GE
foods need not be labeled,61 and stated that “substances expected to
become components of food as a result of genetic modification of a
plant will be the same as or substantially similar to substances
commonly found in food.”62

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

McGarity, supra note 7, at 431.
116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (2000).
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id.
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Materials, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,9484–

85.
60. Id. at 22,992.
61. Id. at 22,991.
62. Id. at 22,985.
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Plaintiffs challenged a variety of aspects of the Statement of
Policy, alleging that the FDA failed to comply with applicable notice
and comment procedures, failed to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it did not complete an
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it presumed GRAS status for GE
foods, and violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) when it decided to not require
labeling.63
On the claim that FDA violated the Administrative Procedure
Act’s rulemaking requirements, the court held that the Policy
Statement was in fact a policy statement, not a rule, because it did not
bind the agency and only created a presumption of GRAS.64 Because
it is a policy statement and not a binding rule, notice and comment
rulemaking was not required.65 The Court also found that the FDA did
not violate NEPA when it failed to complete an environmental
assessment or environmental impact statement because the agency did
not take an agency action, but merely preserved the status quo.66
Moreover, the agency’s GRAS presumption was subject to
Chevron deference and therefore not arbitrary and capricious.67 The
court based its decision about arbitrary and capricious action on the
record at the time the agency created the Policy Statement in 1992, so
information about the safety of GE technology provided by Plaintiffs
after that point could not be used to demonstrate that the FDA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously.68
The Plaintiffs also failed on their labeling claim. The court viewed
the FDA’s conclusion—that the use of GE technology in foods is not a
“material difference” from the use of their naturally occurring
counterparts—as a finding entitled to deference.69 Therefore, the FDA
did not have to label GE foods, and in fact could not, as the FDA does
not have authority to mandate labeling based solely on consumer
opinion.70
63. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
64. Id. at 173.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 174–75.
67. Id. at 176–77.
68. Id. at 177.
69. Id. at 179.
70. Id. Also on the labeling claims, the court denied the First Amendment free exercise claim
because the policy statement is neutral and generally applicable. Id. at 179–80. The court denied
the RFRA claim because labeling food for purposes of religion would come “precariously close
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Although plaintiffs failed on all their claims, Alliance for BioIntegrity v. Shalala is notable for several reasons. First, it was the
earliest major challenge to the government’s Coordinated Framework
and the FDA’s Statement of Policy. Second, it highlights the great
amount of deference the judicial system initially gave to the
government without actually analyzing the science underlying the
agency’s action.71 Third, the case acknowledges that even scientists at
the FDA questioned the government’s approach to regulating
biotechnology at the time of the policy statement.72
As science has progressed, so too have the courts. While Alliance
for Bio-Integrity was a case decided in 2000, using a record created in
or before 1992, more recent cases appear to be less deferential to the
government. In International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs,73, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined Ohio’s
labeling requirements for milk produced using recombinant bovine
somatotropin (rBST), a genetically engineered growth hormone used
in dairy cows to increase milk production.74
In 1992, the FDA approved the use of rBST for milk production
after finding, consistent with its reliance on substantial equivalence,
that “there was no significant difference between milk from treated
and untreated cows.”75 In its guidance document addressing rBST, the
FDA issued guidance for labeling claims.76 The Ohio Department of
Agriculture (ODA) acted on this guidance and implemented the
labeling requirements at issue in the case.77 The International Dairy
Foods Association (IDFA) and other plaintiffs challenged the labeling
requirements as unconstitutional.78 One aspect of the challenged
statute prohibited composition claims on milk labels.79 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed with the FDA’s finding that there “was no

to violating the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” Id. at 180.
71. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 440 (noting the court’s “brief three-paragraph analysis”).
72. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
73. 622 F.3d 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products
from Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg.
6,279, 6,280 (Feb. 10, 1994)).
76. Id. at 632–33.
77. Id. at 633–34.
78. Id. at 634.
79. Id. at 636.
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measurable compositional difference between the two.”80 Disagreeing
with the FDA’s position of substantial equivalence, the court stated:
[The FDA] conclusion is belied by the record, however, which shows
that, contrary to the district court’s assertion, a compositional
difference does exist between milk from untreated cows and
conventional milk (. . .cows treated with rBST). As detailed by the
amici parties seeking to strike down the Rule, the use of rBST in milk
production has been shown to elevate the levels of insulin-like
growth factor 1 (IGF-1), a naturally-occurring hormone that in high
levels is linked to several types of cancers, among other things.81

The court then acknowledged other differences in the milk from
cows treated with rBST, including increased fat and lower protein
content during certain phases, and increased somatic cell counts that
cause milk to sour more quickly.82 These factors, the court stated,
prevented it from agreeing with the FDA that there are no
compositional differences in the two types of milk.83
Because the court found that there is a compositional difference,
a claim such as “rbST free” is not misleading.84 The court then
completed the Central Hudson test for commercial speech and
determined that the ODA’s prohibition on compositional claims like
“rbST free” was unconstitutional.85 In doing so, the court noted that
the state’s interest in preventing deception was weak because the state
did not demonstrate that consumer deception occurred and concluded
that the state’s reliance on the FDA’s guidance document as evidence
that consumers may be misled is not sufficient.86 The court also found
that ODA’s rule did not directly advance the state’s interest and it was
more extensive than necessary.87
This case is significant because, after examining the scientific data,
the court acknowledged that compositional differences may exist
between the products of biotechnology and their naturally occurring
counterparts. Cows treated with GE hormones create a different
product, and milk created from cows treated with rBST is not
substantially equivalent to milk from cows not treated with rBST.88 As
the court suggested, it is misleading to say the two products, created by
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 636–37.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 638–40.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 637 (“Taken collectively, this evidence points to two distinct types of milk.”).
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different processes, are equivalent. The case is also significant because
the court pointedly disagreed with the FDA’s reliance on substantial
equivalence.
B. Environment
Whereas the previous section dealt primarily with the FDA’s
regulation of foods produced using biotechnology and state reliance on
FDA guidance, many individuals and organizations also challenge
biotechnology on environmental grounds. As the Coordinated
Framework indicates, both the EPA and the USDA have limited
authority to regulate the environmental impact of GE crops. In
addition, NEPA requires that federal agencies complete an
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement before
beginning major federal actions.89 A number of environmental
challenges have taken place in response to APHIS attempts to
deregulate specific biotech crops. Because deregulation is a major
federal action, APHIS must complete an environmental impact
statement or an environmental assessment when it chooses to
deregulate a crop.90
In February 2007, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia issued its opinion in International Center for Technology
Assessment v. Johanns,91 which supports the idea that biotechnology
raises new issues and demonstrates one way in which biotechnology
may harm society. The case involved two types of grass, creeping
bentgrass and Kentucky bluegrass, both of which are listed as invasive
weeds by ten federal organizations and 145 non-federal cooperators.92
Scott developed GE versions of the grasses resistant to glyphosate,
which would allow those who plant the GE varieties, like golf courses,
to spray the grass with Round Up and only kill weeds.93 The use of the
GE seed presented a number of concerns, including: gene flow which
could allow the genetically engineered mutation to appear in wild
relatives and persist outside of its intended use, enhanced weediness
since the plant is already considered a pest and would not be able to be
killed with Round Up, and a subsequent increase in the use of more

89. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). All. for Bio-Integrity included a NEPA claim but the court
determined the agency did not undertake a major federal action; it only preserved the status quo.
See supra note 66, and accompanying text.
90. 7 C.F.R. § 372.5 (2016).
91. 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.C.C. 2007).
92. Id. at 13.
93. Id.
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toxic pesticides.94 The International Center for Technology
Assessment (CTA) and other individual plaintiffs sued the USDA for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, challenging the USDA’s
denial of CTA’s petition to have the GE grasses labeled as noxious
weeds under the Plant Protection Act.95 The plaintiffs also included
claims for violations of NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act
when the USDA allowed The Scotts Company (“Scotts”) to grow
certain varieties of genetically engineered grass in field trials without
(1) identifying whether GE creeping bentgrass was a plant pest under
PPA or (2) preparing an environmental impact statement or an
environmental assessment as required by NEPA.96 Scotts, who
petitioned the USDA to deregulate the GE seed at issue, intervened
as a defendant.97
Scotts challenged plaintiff’s standing, arguing that plaintiffs had
not incurred an injury in fact.98 In addressing the argument, the Court
acknowledged that “for injury to plaintiffs’ aesthetic interests to occur,
it is not essential that plaintiffs actually encounter a [glyphosatetolerant creeping bentgrass] plant. To the contrary, the mere desire to
use or observe a plant species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing.”99 In other
words, in order to show that they are harmed by defendants’
deregulation of genetically engineered grass, plaintiffs only have to
show that it is likely that GE seed will establish itself in the wild or
hybridize with naturally occurring grass.100 This later occurred, when
GE seed escaped the field trial area and contaminated the Crooked
River National Grassland 13 miles away from the field trial.101
Where the harm is only an increased risk of natural grass being
contaminated with GE grass, courts must find that the likelihood is
“nontrivial.”102 Following an extensive quantitative analysis, the court
determined the increased risk in this case to be somewhere between
.7% and 8.9%, which it found to be non-trivial.103
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 12–13.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Holly Gill, Study reports spread of GMO, PORTLAND TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2006, 6:00 PM),
http://portlandtribune.com/msp/129-news/138539-study-reports-spread-of-gmo.
102. Int’l Ctr. for Tech., 473 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
103. Id. at 20–21. The court also cited case law that found an increased risk of 1 in 10,000 is
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Following the substantially equivalent line of reasoning, Scotts
argued that even if plaintiffs encountered glyphosate-tolerant creeping
bentgrass in their areas of interest, there would be no harm because
they would not be able to tell the difference, unless they sprayed it with
glyphosate.104 In an apparent rejection of the doctrine of substantial
equivalence, the court stated: “Plaintiffs’ alleged interest is in viewing
native fauna, and the relevant inquiry is whether injury to that interest
is probable or has occurred, regardless of whether the injury is
visible.”105 The fact that plaintiffs could not visually distinguish
between the GE and non-GE plants was irrelevant. Harm to the mere
interest of viewing non-GE plants is sufficient.
Following its finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court
went on to determine that APHIS improperly denied the plaintiffs’
petition to have the grasses listed as noxious weeds, and acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by not completing an environmental
assessment or environmental impact statement when it chose to allow
field trials of glyphosate-tolerant creeping bentgrass.106 The court
remanded the noxious weed petition to APHIS, and noted that APHIS
had wide discretion under the PPA to determine which weeds to
classify as noxious, so long as it based its decision on sound science.107
On the NEPA claim, the court found that APHIS must conduct
an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement
“[w]hen a confined field release of genetically engineered organisms or
products involves new species or organisms or novel modifications that
raise new issues.”108 Because APHIS failed to present evidence that it
had made proper findings to exclude itself from producing an
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for the
field trials, it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.109 According
to the court, the record contained “substantial evidence” that field tests
could significantly affect the “quality of the human environment” and
the “tests may have involved, at the least, novel modifications (if not
“new organisms”) that raised new environmental issues.”110 Because
non-trivial, suggesting an extremely low bar to show harm. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 22.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id. at 26–27. APHIS appears to have utilized its wide discretion when it determined GE
Kentucky Bluegrass was not a noxious weed and therefore not subject to APHIS regulation. See
id. at 22.
108. Id. at 20 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 372.5(d)(4)).
109. Id. at 29.
110. Id. at 30.
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of these new environmental issues, the government could not rely on
the notion that the end product is substantially equivalent to its nonGE counterpart.
The case demonstrates two important factors: (1) the non-trivial
possibility that people will encounter genetically engineered grass in a
natural environment is a legally cognizable harm and (2) the release of
genetically engineered organisms “raise[s] new issues,”111 a proposition
the Coordinated Framework seems to overlook. If the GE grass seed
truly were substantially equivalent, it would not harm plaintiff’s
aesthetic interests and would not raise new issues.
Four years after the case, the USDA determined it would not
regulate Kentucky bluegrass.112 The USDA based its decision on two
factors. First, when Scotts genetically engineered the grass it did not
include a plant pest, a fact that exempted it from the PPA.113 Second,
the USDA determined that the grass is not a noxious weed because it
is the same as naturally occurring bluegrass, which people can find
nearly anywhere.114 Consequently, Scotts is now free to market the
product commercially, and plans to introduce it to the market in
2015.115
While parties who oppose the widespread release of genetically
engineered products have been successful in challenging agency action
to demand environmental assessments or environmental impact
statements, the end result may be of limited significance. Scotts proved
this when it chose to engineer the plant so it did not include a plant
pest, thereby removing it from the USDA’s jurisdiction. Once the
USDA determined it was not a noxious weed, the USDA then had no
authority to regulate the crop. Just as the USDA did when it
determined GE grass was not a noxious weed, agencies may exercise
their discretion after an environmental assessment or environmental
111. Id.
112. USDA Responds to Regulation Requests Regarding Kentucky Bluegrass, APHIS (July 1,
2011), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/newsroom/news/!ut/p/z0/fYzLDoIwEEW_hqWZgfhYg
1EjIWBiTKCbZiANVLCFtqD8vcgHuDsn9wEMcmCKJlmTk1pRt3jB9jzJtkc_umNyOd9OGD
6yOLqmGGC6gxjY_8LyIJ_DwEJglVZOfBzk1DfS8lWV450sDZnZQ0tcibc1Wr88_NGGTNXI
Sdg1C9D3V8CDh5Xj7TIeq3bmZTeK2pC10Les-AJXUuPE/.
113. Id.
114. Id. The USDA’s finding that GE and non-GE Kentucky Bluegrass are the same seems
to ignore the court’s acknowledgment that GE Kentucky Bluegrass is different because it cannot
be killed with Round Up, in addition to the court’s finding that the mere presence of GE plants
harms the aesthetic value the public has in viewing native flora.
115. Mary Vanac, Scotts tests genetically modified grass seed at homes, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Jan. 31, 2014, 8:10 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2014/01/31
/scotts-tests-modified-grass-seed-at-homes.html.
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impact statement to still allow the widespread use of GE products. In
some cases, the existing laws provide an inadequate framework for
addressing the challenges associated with the widespread use of GE
seeds, as the court highlighted in Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack.116
In Center for Food Safety, the plaintiffs challenged APHIS’s
unconditional deregulation of GE alfalfa.117 They argued that APHIS
violated the PPA when it concluded that GE alfalfa was not a plant
pest or noxious weed.118 To support their claim that APHIS should
regulate GE alfalfa as a plant pest, the plaintiffs put forth two primary
arguments: (1) GE alfalfa is a plant pest because it will cross-pollinate
with non-GE alfalfa and (2) widespread commercialization of GE
alfalfa will cause increased glyphosate use and a subsequent increase
in superweeds.119
After reviewing the PPA and applicable regulations, the court
noted that APHIS correctly determined that GE alfalfa was not a plant
pest and that, once it made that decision, it no longer had discretion to
do anything other than deregulate GE alfalfa.120 The definition of plant
pest and the agency’s longstanding interpretation of plant pests did not
include any consideration of the potential for cross-pollination and
increased glyphosate resistance among weeds.121 The court also found
that the agency was not required to review GE alfalfa as a noxious
weed once it determined it was not a plant pest.122 Because no party
petitioned APHIS to make such a determination, APHIS did not err
when it did not evaluate GE alfalfa as a noxious weed.123
Interestingly, APHIS noted in its environmental impact statement
that the environmentally preferred outcome is continued regulation of
GE alfalfa.124 APHIS acknowledged that the possible harms from
deregulation include cross-pollination that might harm organic and
non-GE farmers, cross-pollination that could limit exports to foreign
markets that do not allow GE products, and potential increased costs

116. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 2013).
117. Id. at 832.
118. Id.
119. Id. In earlier litigation, Plaintiffs established that bees pollinate alfalfa and GE alfalfa
may be cross-pollinated at a distance of up to 2 miles from the field where it is planted. Geertson
Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06–01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007)
(memorandum).
120. Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 841.
121. Id. at 840–41.
122. Id. at 843.
123. Id. at 833.
124. Id. at 838.
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for non-GE farmers who have to test their crops for the presence of
GE alfalfa.125 But APHIS cannot consider these economic harms in its
determination of what constitutes a plant pest.126 Similarly, the Court
and APHIS acknowledged that deregulation of GE alfalfa will increase
glyphosate use by an estimated 4800 percent, but the PPA does not
concern itself with such possibilities.127
Center for Food Safety highlights the need for congressional
action. In a comment directed at the challenges of regulating GE
technology under the Coordinated Framework, the court said, “The
job of updating the [Plant Protection Act] to address the potential
harms caused by genetic modification (including transgenic
contamination and increased herbicide use) is a job for the Congress,
not this court, to undertake.”128
The earlier stages of litigation in this case also demonstrated that
courts are unwilling to accept the underlying premise of the
Coordinated Framework in claims alleging violations of NEPA. In
Geertson Seed Farms v. Monsanto, the precursor to Center for Food
Safety, the district court ruled that APHIS’s finding of no significant
impact under its environmental assessment failed to take the “hard
look” required by NEPA.129 Unlike the statutes used to regulate under
the Coordinated Framework, NEPA aims to prevent “other
undesirable and unattended consequences” in addition to protecting
health, safety, and the environment.130 Because of its wide scope, the
“hard look” required by NEPA allows, and requires, agencies to
consider a multitude of factors, including increased glyphosate use and
the potential for transgenic pollination.131 Because bees pollinate
alfalfa and can travel up to two miles, non-GE farmers in a 2-mile
radius are at risk for cross-pollination.132 The court acknowledged that
it is an undesirable consequence to eliminate “a farmer’s choice to
grow non-genetically engineered crops, or a consumer’s choice to eat

125. Id. at 841.
126. Id. at 838. See also 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) (2012) (limiting plant pests to agents at any living
stage).
127. Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 836, 841.
128. Id. at 841.
129. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06–01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (memorandum).
130. Id. at 9–10.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id. at 2.
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non-genetically engineered food.”133 Rejecting the doctrine of
substantial equivalence, the court stated:
For those farmers who choose to grow non-genetically engineered
alfalfa, the possibility that their crops will be infected with the
engineered gene is tantamount to the elimination of all alfalfa; they
cannot grow their chosen crop. The government’s apparent belief
that farmers’ and consumers’ choice is irrational because the
engineered gene is similar in all biological respects to a gene found
in nature (although never in alfalfa) is beside the point.134

Both Geertson and Center for Food Safety are important for
several reasons. First, both cases acknowledge the severe limitations
of the Coordinated Framework and highlight that there are both
economic and environmental consequences that the government has
not adequately addressed with existing law. Second, they further
demonstrate that at least some courts are unwilling to accept the
artificial distinction between process and product as drawn by the
Coordinated Framework. Third, each case’s complex procedural
history and arguments demonstrate the need for clearer guidance on
biotechnology.135
C. Intellectual Property
As it did with laws that regulate biotechnology in food and the
environment, Congress did not specifically authorize intellectual
property protection for products of biotechnology. Rather, inventors
protect genetically engineered seeds and seed parts using statutes that
predate the advent of biotechnology.136 Although seed producers have
three different means to protect their inventions, a utility patent
provides the greatest amount of protection from infringing uses and

133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 9.
135. The case originated as Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns in the district court. See id. at *1.
Monsanto, who intervened as a Defendant, appealed the scope of the district court’s injunction
to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns,
570 F.3d 1130 at 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). Monsanto appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 at 166
(2010). APHIS released its environmental impact statement, as ordered by the district court, in
December 2010. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829 at 838 (9th Cir. 2013). The Center
for Food Safety then filed suit against APHIS and appealed the district court’s decision to uphold
the agency’s decision to deregulate. Id. at 831–32. The dispute culminated in Ctr. for Food Safety
v. Vilsack, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Id. at 843.
136. See Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States,
Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151 (2005) (discussing the
history of seed-specific legislation during the early 20th century).
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allows GE seed producers to patent individual components of a seed.137
As a result, manufacturers of genetically engineered seeds primarily
rely on utility patents to protect their product.
The Supreme Court’s application of agricultural biotechnology to
patent law demonstrates that (1) unlike the Coordinated Framework,
process matters and (2) the fact that something is human-made makes
it different enough from its natural counterpart to be patentable
subject matter.
Two cases demonstrate how utility patent protection came about
for GE seeds, even though neither case deals directly with them.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty involves a genetically engineered
bacterium138 and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.
involves a traditionally bred hybrid seed.139 Chakrabarty and J.E.M.
Ag Supply, Inc., when read together, demonstrate that genetically
engineered seeds are patentable subject matter for which a biotech
company can obtain a utility patent.
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court addressed the patentable
subject matter requirement for obtaining a utility patent. Chakrabarty,
a microbiologist, sought a patent on human-made, genetically
engineered bacteria that could break down components of crude oil.140
Congress identified the scope of patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, which states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.141

The court focused on “manufacture” and “composition of
matter.”142 Citing a dictionary definition and prior case law, the court
defined manufacture as: “the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by

137. Id. at 166. The other two forms of protection are a Plant Patent and a Plant Variety
Protection Certificate. Although the court in both Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag. Supply discusses
both, this article focuses on utility patents. For additional information about Plant Variety
Protection Certificates and Plant Patents, see David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and
Genetically-Modified Foods: Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J. L. & TECH. 7, 14–22 (2003).
138. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
139. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
140. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
142. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
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machinery.”143 Referring to “common usage” and again citing case law,
the Court defined composition of matter to include “all compositions
of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they
be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether
they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.”144 After examining legislative
history, the Court concluded that “Congress intended statutory subject
matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”145
Following its broad interpretation of patentable subject matter,
the Court acknowledged the limits of § 101. Citing a series of cases
dating back to 1853, the Court stated, “[t]he laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”146 For
instance, Einstein could not patent “his celebrated law that E=mc2,”
Newton could not patent the law of gravity, and nobody could patent
“a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the
wild.”147 These latter examples explicitly recognize that products of
nature, like naturally occurring seeds, are not patentable subject
matter.
Distinguishing Chakrabarty’s bacteria from “a hitherto unknown
natural phenomenon,” the court found that man-made bacteria are
patentable subject matter because they are “a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity
having a distinct name, character [and] use.”148 Moreover, “the
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature . . . [the] discovery is not
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject
matter under § 101.”149
Thus, Chakrabarty stands for the proposition that living things are
patentable subject matter under § 101, and the relevant distinction is
not between living and non-living, but between human-made and
naturally occurring. Nobody disputed the fact that the bacteria in
Chakrabarty were a product of human invention, nor could they. The
bacteria, as patented, do not exist in nature.

143. Id. (internal citations omitted).
144. Id. (internal citations omitted).
145. Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschlalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 309–10 (internal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 310.
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Although the Court in Chakrabarty referred to the Plant Patent
Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA), it
did so in the context of determining the scope of patentable subject
matter, and more specifically, to determine whether § 101 included
living things. It did not examine whether those acts are the sole means
for patenting plants, a matter which it decided in J.E.M. Ag Supply.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the Patent
and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
determined plants were included in the meaning of “manufacture” and
“composition of matter,” which made them patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.150 At the time of J.E.M. Ag Supply, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office had issued more than 1,800 utility
patents for plants, plant parts, and seeds under 35 U.S.C. § 101.151
Pioneer Hi-Bred owned such patents on 17 different plants and plant
parts, and sold such varieties subject to a “limited label license” that
restricted seed use “solely to produce grain and/or forage.”152 J.E.M.
Ag Supply, who was not an authorized dealer, purchased patented
hybrid seeds which bore the license agreement, and resold them.153
Pioneer Hi-Bred subsequently brought a patent infringement
154
suit. J.E.M. Ag Supply denied infringement and filed a counterclaim
for patent invalidity, arguing that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (creating
plant patents) and the PVPA (creating Plant Variety Protection
certificates) are the exclusive means for protecting plant life, which
makes utility patents obtained on plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101
invalid.155
The Court examined the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA, and
relied heavily on their finding in Chakrabarty that Congress intended
for 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be broad in scope and applicability.156
Consequently, the Court found that “plants have always had the
potential to fall within the general subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101,”
even though the written description requirement previously made it
difficult to get a utility patent.157 The Court concluded that the 1930
Plant Patent Act recognized that a plant breeder’s work was patentable

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
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and relaxed the written description requirement, which made it easier
for plant breeders to obtain patent protection under a separate plant
patent.158
According to the Court, denying breeders a utility patent simply
because it was difficult to obtain in 1930, however, “would be
inconsistent with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent
statute.”159 In that regard, the 1930 Plant Patent Act did not broaden
the scope of patentable subject matter, it just made it easier for plant
breeders to obtain patent protection on new products.160
The Court also examined the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA), and reached a similar conclusion. The Plant Patent Act only
provided intellectual property protection to asexually reproduced
plants (reproduced by grafts) and not to sexually reproduced plants
(reproduced by seeds).161 The Plant Variety Protection Act extended
intellectual property protection to certain sexually reproduced
plants.162 As the court noted, the PVPA does not state that Congress
intended for PVPA certificates to be the exclusive means of intellectual
property protection for sexually reproduced plants.163
Because PVPA protection is easier to obtain and protects less, it
can “easily be reconciled” with allowing plants protection under a
utility patent.164 In order to obtain a certificate under PVPA, a breeder
must only demonstrate that the variety is new, distinct, uniform, and
stable.165 To get a utility patent, a breeder must show that the plant is
useful and nonobvious.166 In addition, varieties protected by certificates
under PVPA are subject to more exemptions that weaken the holder’s
rights when compared to a utility patent, including exemptions for
research and saving seed to plant the next year’s crop.167 A utility
patent has no such exceptions.168 Because the two different forms of
protection have different requirements, and varying levels of
protection, they can coexist and those that do not meet the stringent
158. Id. at 134.
159. Id. at 135.
160. See id. at 134 (noting the PPA “gave patent protection to breeders who were previously
unable to overcome the obstacles described in Chakrabarty”).
161. Id. at 132.
162. Id. at 138.
163. Id. at 141.
164. Id. at 138.
165. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2012).
166. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).
167. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 140.
168. Id. at 143.
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requirements for utility patent protection may still qualify for
protection under a PVPA certificate.169
Justice Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, considered
the Court’s heavy reliance on Chakrabarty misplaced.170 He argued
that the Court in Chakrabarty examined two statutes that did not deal
specifically with bacteria, in order to determine whether bacteria were
patentable subject matter.171 Here, the Court had been asked to
determine the scope of the same two statutes, which specifically deal
with the subject matter in dispute—plants.172 Justice Breyer interpreted
the Plant Patent Act, noting that it applies to all plants, not just those
asexually reproduced, so long as they are distinct, new, and on one or
more occasion have been asexually reproduced.173 He correctly noted
that “virtually any plant” can reproduce both sexually and asexually,
and that the coverage provided by the act gave the breeder a monopoly
over asexual reproduction.174 By excluding sexual reproduction, or
reproduction through seeds, Congress allowed farmers to continue the
long-standing practice of saving seed.175 Despite Justice Breyer’s
compelling dissent, the law today allows plant breeders to obtain a
utility patent on their inventions.
Although the seeds in dispute were a patented hybrid line and not
genetically engineered, Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag Supply read
together demonstrate that genetically engineered seeds are patentable
subject matter for which a biotech company can obtain a utility patent.
Similar to the Coordinated Framework, the Supreme Court is also
unwilling to stand in the way of innovation. However, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that, unlike the Coordinated Framework, it
understands that process matters.
IV. ANALYSIS
The previous cases demonstrate why Congress must enact
meaningful legislation to regulate biotechnology. Today, scientists
know more about the science underlying agricultural biotechnology

169. Id. at 144.
170. See id. at 147 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that Chakrabarty did not consider the
relevant question of “whether the words ‘manufacture’ or ‘compositions of matter’ . . . cover
plants that also fall within the scope of” the PPA and PVPA).
171. Id. at 148–49.
172. Id. at 149.
173. Id. at 150.
174. Id. at 150–51.
175. Id. at 151.
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and that science shows that the assumptions made in creating the
Coordinated Framework are outdated. As recent cases demonstrate,
the Coordinated Framework also fails to account for the interests of
those affected by biotechnology. Moreover, current law, which focuses
on process in granting intellectual property protection and final
product in food safety and environmental regulation, is inconsistent.
Lastly, courts cannot currently provide a satisfactory remedy to those
harmed by biotechnology. As a result, Congress is the only branch of
government that can create a meaningful framework to regulate
biotechnology.
A. The underlying assumptions of the Coordinated Framework are
outdated
Science has progressed significantly since the promulgation of the
Coordinated Framework. At the time of its drafting, the framework
reflected the scientific belief that one gene sequence was traited for
one specific protein.176 When scientists injected that one sequence into
a new organism, they believed they were only entering one trait.177 This
now-rudimentary understanding is demonstrably false, as biologists
have confirmed that gene sequences are networks that overlap and
interact in a way such that the insertion of a gene sequence in a new
plant will alter the way these sequences operate and communicate with
one another.178 As early as 2000, other countries began to question
their reliance on the doctrine of substantial equivalence, including
major U.S. trade partners the European Union and Canada.179
The GE pea plant example at the beginning of this article
demonstrates just how unsophisticated our understanding of
biotechnology is. This alone should give consumers and Congress
some pause. While GE plants currently on the market may not have
these allergenic properties (or such allergenic properties have not yet
presented themselves), the mere possibility that the Coordinated
Framework created a pathway for the possibility of such characteristics
176. See Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the “Uncoordinated” Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 311, 339 (2013) (noting that the Coordinated
Framework’s doctrine of substantial equivalence is based on the “one gene-one protein” model);
Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221–22.
177. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note 175, at 339–40 (noting the tenant of the “Central
Dogma”); Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221–22.
178. Lee-Muramoto, supra note 175, at 341; Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221.
179. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 489–90 (“With the impending demise of the substantial
equivalence doctrine as a credible theoretical underpinning, the fragile veneer that has protected
the regulatory process in the United States from overwhelming criticism is cracking.”).
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in our food is alarming. The Coordinated Framework operates under
the assumption that products of biotechnology are the same as their
natural counterparts, but the GE pea plant demonstrates otherwise.
The troubles resulting from these outdated assumptions are
compounded in the courts. When the court heard Alliance for BioIntegrity in 2000, it reviewed an FDA record developed in the lead-up
to the FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy. Eight years passed from the
time the FDA created the record and the time the court heard the
challenge. While the plaintiffs had contemporary scientific evidence
that demonstrated fallacies in the Statement of Policy, the court could
not consider them in determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in 1992. Today, scientists know even more about
genetic engineering, or at the very least, have a greater understanding
of how much we do not know. But challenging agency action—be it
that of the FDA, the EPA, or the USDA—is exceedingly difficult when
these agencies are operating under the Coordinated Framework, a
policy developed based on an understanding of science in 1986.
When the drafters of the Coordinated Framework created the
policy, they failed to account for the ways in which GE technology
would alter biology and ecology. In their minds, GE technology
created a product substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart.
So, in theory, the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin as a growth
hormone in dairy cows caused those cows to produce milk substantially
equivalent to milk from cows not treated with rBST.
Thankfully, not all court actions are limited to older agency
records that rely on outdated science. In International Dairy, the court
found that the two milk products were in fact compositionally
different.180 Milk produced from cows with rBST had higher levels of
insulin-like growth factor 1, higher somatic cell counts, and, during
certain phases of milk production, increased fat and decreased protein
content.181 Thus, at least one court opinion uses quantifiable science to
highlight a fallacy in the Coordinated Framework’s underlying
assumption of substantial equivalence.
Similarly, scientists continue to learn more about DNA. We now
know that genes overlap with each other and operate in a network
instead of segmented parts that scientists can remove from one plant
and expect to perform the same function in another.182 The growing
180. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010).
181. Id. at 636–37.
182. See Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 231–32 (noting that “sections of previously characterized
junk DNA modulate a labyrinthine of silencing, switching and splicing operations”).
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field of epigenetics is helping scientists understand how and when
genes express themselves, and the possibility that certain factors may
silence genetic expression in one instance, and unleash its expression
in later iterations.183 Just like individuals in a community, genes
interact with one another and are a product of their environment.184
When removed, they can and do act differently. Because society does
not have the benefit of centuries of knowledge and real world trials
with these new plants as they do with naturally occurring plants,
assuming that our bodies and the environment will interact with them
in the exact same way is shortsighted.
B. The Coordinated Framework does not account for all interests
affected by biotechnology
The Coordinated Framework’s focus on products of
biotechnology unnecessarily limits the scope of factors impacted by GE
technology. This is particularly noticeable in three different areas: the
environment, international trade, and the non-GE growing industry.
Both Center for Food Safety and Geerston Seed Farms highlight
the disconnect created by the Coordinated Framework’s silence on the
environmental effects of biotechnology. The court in Center for Food
Safety acknowledged that annual glyphosate use would increase from
a half-million pounds to more than 24 million pounds,185 which
undeniably creates additional stress on the environment. The court
explicitly acknowledged its inability to address the known increase in
herbicide use that will result from the deregulation of alfalfa. While
the district court in Geertson Seed Farms found that increased
glyphosate use was a factor showing that the USDA failed to take the
hard look required by NEPA, this finding only helped establish that
the USDA needed to complete an environmental impact statement.186
After completing the environmental impact statement, the USDA did

183. See id. at 236–37 (noting that epigenetic mechanisms “turn genes on and off during the
course of an organism’s life” according to environmental factors).
184. See id. at 236 (“Epigentics concentrates on the multiple influences on DNA . . . that
determine whether genes are turned on and off . . . .”); see also id. at 237 (describing epigenetic
inheritance in genetically modified food).
185. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2013).
186. See Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075, 2007 WL 1302981 at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 3, 2007) (memorandum) (“[G]ene transmission could and had occurred . . . [and] failure to
analyze the likely extent of gene flow . . . did not demonstrate the ‘hard look’ required by
NEPA.”); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2,743, 2,759 (noting that
under some circumstances it could be “hard to see why the limited planting and harvesting . . . did
not also require the preparation of an EIS).
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not have the authority to stop deregulation of alfalfa.187 As a result,
one of the few accomplishments of existing laws and regulations is that
they confirm that the deregulation of alfalfa would cause growers to
use more glyphosate.188 Although the EPA has the authority to
regulate the amount of glyphosate used on crops, that decision making
process is not included with or tied into the decision to deregulate a
GE crop. Because the alfalfa in question was not modified to include
a pesticide, the EPA had no role in the GE approval process even
though deregulation of the GE seed will have a significant impact on
the environment and the amount of glyphosate used. The Coordinated
Framework fails to consider environmental concerns, thereby drawing
a completely artificial line between food production and the
environment.
Another interest identified in Center for Food Safety, throughout
the opinion, was the potential impact of adventitious presence, or
unauthorized cross-pollination.189 The possibility of cross-pollination
is particularly relevant for GE alfalfa because alfalfa is pollinated by
bees which can travel up to two miles, thereby creating risks for nonGE alfalfa growers up to two miles away from a GE alfalfa field.190
Cross-pollination has the potential to impact a number of different
areas, including international trade, organic production, and non-GE
production. Because some foreign countries will not import genetically
engineered products,191 farmers whose non-GE crops are crosscontaminated with GE crops will suffer losses. In some instances, a
country will ban all imports of a specific crop from a country based
merely on a fear that imported crops may contain GE products, which
can impact an entire industry. For example, when an Oregon farmer
discovered rogue GE wheat in his field, Japan halted all imports of
Oregon wheat.192 Wheat growers throughout the United States sued
187. See Ctr. For Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 842 (“[O]nce APHIS concluded that RRA was not
a plant pest . . . the agency had no jurisdiction to continue regulating the crop.”).
188. Id. at 841.
189. See id. at 832 (noting the plaintiff’s concern over RRA cross-pollinating with
conventional alfalfa plants).
190. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J101
AND J103: REQUEST OF NONREGULATED STATUS 25–26 (2010), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/bio
technology/downloads/alfalfa/gt_alfalfa%20_feis.pdf.
191. Sarah Shemkus, Is China’s GMO Corn Ban Protecting Consumers or Protecting
Markets?, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
2014/nov/20/china-gmo-corn-boycott-markets.
192. Aya Takada, Japan Halts Some U.S. Wheat Imports on Gene-Altered Crops,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0530/japan-halts-some-u-s-wheat-imports-on-gene-altered-crops; Dan Charles, In Oregon, the
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Monsanto, the producer of the GE seeds, for economic losses incurred
as a result of Japan’s ban.193 As this example makes clear, both possible
and actual cross-contamination of non-GE crops with GE crops can
lead to economic losses for growers of non-GE seed. With a crop such
as alfalfa that is easily subject to cross-pollination, nothing in the
current GE regulatory process forces any government agency to
consider the potential economic impacts of cross-pollination before a
GE product enters the market.
The possibility of cross-pollination for organic and non-GE
producers can have even greater economic impacts. If these types of
growers want to export their products, they will run into the same
problems noted above. Even in domestic markets, however, they will
likely incur additional costs. Organic farmers cannot sell their crops as
organic if they are contaminated with GE product. As a result, the
organic farmer typically must pay for additional testing to ensure the
absence of GE crops. If organic crops are contaminated, the farmer
loses the benefit of an organic crop price premium. Also, an organic
farmer may buy seeds that allow her to save seed to plant the next year,
like most farmers used to do. If GE seeds contaminate the farmer’s
fields they not only lose their organic status, but the farmer also incurs
additional costs in buying more seeds the following year. Because
there is now a price premium associated with some non-GE crops,
these same realities apply to growers who choose to raise non-GE
crops, even if not certified organic.194
C. Focus on product, and not process is artificial and inconsistent
Although prescient observers likely knew it in 1986, the distinction
between product and process in the Coordinated Framework is
artificial and inconsistent. Thankfully, the courts seem less willing than
the executive branch to accept this artificial distinction. The court in
International Center acknowledged that process alone can cause harm.
There, residents of Central Oregon had an interest in viewing native
flora and the small possibility that GE grass could replace native grass,
even though it looked the same, was sufficient to cause an injury.
GMO Wheat Mystery Deepens, NPR: THE SALT (July 17, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/
2013/07/17/202684064/in-oregon-the-gmo-wheat-mystery-deepens.
193. Elizabeth Barber, Monsanto Reaches $2.4M Settlement with U.S. Wheat Farmers, TIME
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://time.com/3582953/monsanto-wheat-farming-genetically-modified-settlem
ent/.
194. Jacob Bunge, Fields of Gold: GMO-Free Crops Prove Lucrative for Farmers, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fields-of-gold-gmo-free-cropsprove-lucrative-for-farmers-1422909700.
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Visually, the two products—GE grass and non-GE grass—appeared
the same. However, the fact that Scotts genetically engineered one of
the grasses was enough to harm the plaintiff’s interest in viewing native
flora.
Center for Food Safety and Geertson also highlight the fact that
process matters. If the GE alfalfa truly was substantially equivalent to
its natural counterpart, the parties would not have pursued the case up
to the Supreme Court and then back to the Ninth Circuit. Food is the
unique result of many interdependent factors in the production
process, and the alteration of any single factor can have a butterfly
effect on the entire chain, including a different end product. To
regulate food without regard to these factors, and the important steps
each of them play, is indefensibly shortsighted.
The alternative, an emphasis on process rather than product,
would be consistent with other aspects of food regulation. Foods
labeled organic are organic because of the process by which farmers
and food manufacturers created them.195 Fish markets can label fish as
“wild caught” because of how the fish are raised and harvested.196 Juice
created from concentrate is labeled “from concentrate” because of the
process by which it is created.197 Olive oil can be labeled extra virgin
because of the way it is pressed.198 These examples demonstrate that
an emphasis on process is not new in the regulation of food.
Perhaps nowhere is the distinction between process and product
more relevant than in intellectual property protection. In order to
obtain a utility patent, which is the primary means for protecting
biotech products, the inventor must show, among other things, that the
product is man-made. In that regard, intellectual property protection
completely flips the analysis and focuses exclusively on process. While
neither the Coordinated Framework nor the 1992 Policy Statement
purported to address intellectual property, the case law is relevant for
two reasons. First, like the Coordinated Framework, Congress created
the laws that govern intellectual property rights in biotech products
prior to the advent of agricultural biotechnology.199 As a result, courts
had to apply then-existing law to new technology. Second, the grant of

195. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2016) (defining “organic”).
196. Cf. 7 C.F.R. § 60.300 (2016) (stating that product sold as a combination of farm-raised
and wild fish may be labeled “wild caught”).
197. 21 C.F.R. § 102.33(g)(1) (2016).
198. See United States Standards for Grades of Olive Oil and Olive-Pomace Oil, 74 Fed. Reg.
22,363 (Oct. 25, 2010) (noting that extra virgin olive oil is unprocessed).
199. See generally supra note 1.

Findley - For Publication (Do Not Delete)

3/9/2017 11:08 AM

150

[Vol. XXVII:119

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

intellectual property rights has fueled the rapid increase in the use of
GE technology.200 Absent Congressional action, courts have taken on
the responsibility of expanding the scope of protection for agricultural
biotech companies and have allowed them to extend their monopolies.
When determining the scope of patentable subject matter, the
court acknowledged the economic incentive provided by patent
protection: the grant or denial of a patent determines whether research
is “accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of
incentives.”201 Thus, when the Supreme Court determined the relevant
distinction is whether the product is created by man or nature, it
“accelerated the hope of reward” for man-made products of
biotechnology. Moreover, the court based its expansion of this right
entirely on how manufacturers created the product. It is inconsistent
to base the grant of a monopoly on process, and to then limit the
regulation of that monopoly based on product.
D. Courts have taken it as far as they can, now Congress must act
Despite a patchwork of laws and regulations, courts have dutifully
examined the facts surrounding the rapid increase in agricultural
biotechnology. From Alliance for Bio-Integrity in 2000 to Center for
Food Safety in 2013, courts have increased their scrutiny when
examining the government’s reliance on the doctrine of substantial
equivalence. Recent cases highlight not only the unwillingness of
courts to accept the doctrine, but also their limitations in demanding
greater agency action.
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity, where the court sided with the
government on every claim challenging the FDA’s 1992 Policy
Statement, the dispute was largely procedural and the court did not
have an opportunity to examine the most recent scientific data. The
court’s analysis was short and demonstrated the limitations of relying
on an agency’s interpretation of existing statutes. It is difficult to show
arbitrary and capricious behavior, particularly when relying on dated
science. Even though some scientists at the FDA disagreed when the
agency created the Policy Statement, this disagreement was insufficient
to find the agency’s actions arbitrary and capricious. Because the
court’s review of agency action is limited to the agency’s record at the
time the agency acted, new science, even if contrary to previously
accepted science, is not relevant. Lastly, because the government’s
200. Brian D. Wright, Plant Genetic Engineering and Intellectual Property Protection,
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA SERIES, PUBLICATION 8,186, at 4.
201. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
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policy directing agency regulation of biotechnology is based not on law,
but on an executive branch notice (Coordinated Framework) and
policy statements (Statement of Policy), it is difficult to challenge the
underlying approach or influence the creation of policy as one would
in the traditional democratic process through legislation in Congress or
rulemaking in administrative agencies.202
In International Dairy, the court offered little deference to the
FDA and the State of Ohio’s reliance on FDA guidance. There, the
court could, and did, consider more recent science when it found that
milk from cows treated with GE hormones created milk
compositionally different from cows treated without GE hormones.
Unlike Alliance for Bio-Integrity, the challenge to agency regulation
occurred closer to the time of the regulation, and the record more
accurately reflected the state of science. The court found the State of
Ohio’s reliance on FDA guidance and the doctrine of substantial
equivalence misplaced. The process mattered, and the process created
a different product. As a result, the government could not prevent
dairy producers from identifying their milk as being from cows not
treated with rBST. Despite the favorable outcome for dairy farmers
who did not use rBST, the case involved a state regulation that relied
on FDA guidance. While the Ohio regulation was unconstitutional,
questionable guidance still exists at the federal level.
In International Center, the court again analyzed quantitative
scientific data and came to the conclusion that GE crops are not
substantially equivalent to their natural counterparts.203 There, the
court concluded that a member of the public is harmed even when the
possibility of them seeing GE grass in the natural environment is less
than 10% (or even as small as less than 1%).204 The fact that GE and
non-GE grasses look the same is irrelevant. The mere fact that one is
genetically engineered to be glyphosate resistant is enough to harm the
public’s interest in seeing native flora. Moreover, because of the risk
to the environment from cross-pollination and the inability to control
pollen flow, the government must complete an environmental impact
statement.205 This highlights the court’s belief that genetically

202. See Peck, supra note 29.
203. See supra notes 90–110 and accompanying text (summarizing the case).
204. See Int’l. Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F.Supp 2d 9, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2007)
(noting that Crooked River National Grassland’s “extremely close” proximity to area where
“near-term GTCB establishment risk may fall somewhere between 0.7 and 8.9 percent” means
that “the risk is certainly non-trivial” that GTCB could establish itself in the Grassland).
205. See id. at 29–30.
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engineered plants present unique issues and are not equivalent to
naturally occurring counterparts.
But the court’s authority is limited. As Scotts later demonstrated,
scientists can circumvent existing regulations by using different
techniques for genetic engineering. After the case, the USDA
determined that it did not have the authority to regulate a variety of
glyphosate resistant Kentucky bluegrass created by Scotts because it
was not a plant pest or noxious weed. While some believe the USDA’s
reasoning is questionable, it may be difficult to prove it is arbitrary and
capricious. The new product presents the same concerns raised by the
court in International Center, but the USDA’s interpretation of laws
that predate biotechnology have limited the scope of the court’s power.
The limitations of the judicial system are highlighted and expressly
acknowledged in Center for Food Safety. There, following several
rounds of appellate litigation, the court found that after completing an
environmental impact statement the USDA completed its statutory
mandate.206 Although new harms were likely to occur, including
potential economic losses and environmental damage, the court had no
authority to require the USDA to consider those impacts in deciding
to deregulate alfalfa.207 The district court in Geertson undertook a
rigorous analysis of scientific data and found that the USDA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it found no significant impact to the
environment by the deregulation of GE alfalfa. Rather, unlike its
natural counterpart, GE alfalfa presented a number of potential
environmental and economic harms that the USDA had to consider.
But, after a circuitous path through the courts, the Ninth Circuit found
in Center for Food Safety that there is no other remedy within the
existing framework.
After requiring an environmental impact
statement, the judicial system could do nothing more to address the
environmental and economic harms caused by the deregulation of
alfalfa.208
Consequently, the impetus is on Congress. Consumer groups and
non-GE farmers can continue to challenge the government and
biotechnology companies in court, but the remedies available to them
do little more than delay the inevitable. Because there are valuable
interests not currently accounted for, including the future health and
206. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F. 3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013).
207. See id. at 842 (holding that the USDA “was not required to look at alternatives to the
unconditional deregulation of RRA” because it lacked jurisdiction to adopt the alternatives).
208. See id. (holding that the USDA was not required to consider the alternatives to
deregulation).
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wellbeing of society and the environment, Congress needs to act. Like
technological advances in other areas, including drones, information
technology, and energy, citizens have a right to participate in the
democratic process on issues that impact their lives. When the
government deliberately conceals those avenues by governing from
notices and policy statements, it fails to represent the people.
CONCLUSION
In the nearly thirty years since the Coordinated Framework, many
things have changed. While it might have been a difficult task thirty
years ago even for the most prudent observer forecasting these changes
and trying to predict the ways in which agricultural biotechnology
might impact our lives, we now have the experience necessary to
identify at least some of these impacts. Most notably, we know that
food safety for GE products is not as simple as we thought, we know
that GE products impact the environment through increased pesticide
use and cross-pollination with non-GE crops, and we know that the use
of GE crops can cause negative economic consequences. The
Coordinated Framework accounts for none of these impacts. While a
growing number of cases in the judicial system question the doctrine of
substantial equivalence and highlight gaps in the Coordinated
Framework, courts are increasingly limited in the remedies they can
provide. As a result, it is time for government to operate in the way
our founders intended. Congress needs to create and pass laws that
meaningfully address the interests unaccounted for by a patchwork of
legislative shortcomings.

